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ABSTRACT 
Complementarities in Innovation Policy 
by Pierre Mohnen and Lars-Hendrik Röller*   
This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy 
using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a discrete test of supermodularity 
in innovation policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. We apply our test to two 
types of innovation decisions: to innovate or not, and if so, by how much. We find that 
industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with some industries being 
complementary across all obstacles. We also find that the lack internal human capital (skilled 
personnel) is complementary to all the other obstacles in almost all industries. In this sense, 
our results suggest that internal human capital is key for any innovation policy, insofar that it 
is complementary to all the other factors that might hamper innovation activities. 
 
JEL Code: L5, 031, 038 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
Innovationspolitik als komplementäres System 
In diesem Beitrag wird die Innovationsfähigkeit von Unternehmen in Abhängigkeit von 
Standortfaktoren – wie etwa die Bereitstellung von Risikokapital, staatliche Regulierungen, 
und qualifizierte Mitarbeiter – als komplementäres System modelliert. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie 
die neue Komplementaritätstheorie in der empirischen Innovationsforschung angewandt 
werden kann, indem die Innovationsfunktion von Unternehmen auf die Eigenschaft der 
Supermodularität hin überprüft wird. Unter Berücksichtigung dieses Ansatzes wird, anhand 
von Innovationsdaten aus der CIS Datenbank, die Komplementaritätshypothese für eine Reihe 
von Industrien und Länder untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auf, daß viele Branchen von 
einem beträchtlichen Maße an Komplementarität gekennzeichnet sind. Damit bestätigen die 
Befunde, daß Innovationen, in bestimmten Branchen, ein koordiniertes Handeln der unter-
schiedlichen Standortfaktoren voraussetzt. Als höchst komplementär zu allen anderen Stand-
ortfaktoren in fast allen Industriezweigen erweist sich der Mangel an qualifiziertem Human-
kapital. In diesem Sinne bekräftigen unsere Ergebnisse die These, daß Humankapital der 
Schlüssel für jede Innovationspolitik ist, insbesondere aufgrund der komplementären 
Beziehung zu allen anderen Faktoren. 
                                                 
*  We like to thank Dietmar Harhoff, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne, and David Soskice for their detailed 
comments. We also like to thank Susan Athey, Astrid Jung, and Jacques Mairesse, as well as the 
participants of the WZB-Cirano workshop on “Innovation and Supermodularity”, June 15-17, Montreal. 
Julio Rosa provided competent research support. We acknowledge funding from the GAAC project on 
“Impediments to Innovation: A Complementarities Approach”, by the research network ‘Product 
Markets, Financial Markets and the Pace of Innovation in Europe’ (Contract no.: HPRN-CT-2000-00061) 
of the RTN Program of the European Commission, by the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada strategic grant “Challenges and Opportunities of a Knowledge-Based Economy”, and 
by Statistics Canada. All remaining errors are ours. 
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1. Introduction 
The question as to whether policy variables are interrelated is important.  In fact, this is one of 
the more central issues in policy analysis.  Changing one policy variable may have no effect – 
or indeed an undesirable effect – if other policy variables are not changed at the same time.  
Understanding these interlinkages amongst choice variables may indeed be a prerequisite to 
successfully handle today’s policy challenges. For example, what is the use of giving out 
R&D tax incentives to stimulate R&D, if the requisite R&D workforce is not available? 
A prominent arena where such interlinkages are often cited is in the study of innovation.  
Innovation patterns display considerable variation across industries and countries.  It is often 
argued that innovation is a complex outcome, influenced by many factors that are interrelated.  
More importantly, the interrelatedness of those factors is often described as one that is 
complementary, i.e. the factors act together and reinforce each other (Dosi, 1988).  This paper 
provides a simple framework for empirically identifying and measuring complementarities in 
innovation policy. 
A group of activities is complementary if doing more of any subset of them increases the 
returns from doing more of any subset of the remaining activities.  In a standard 
(differentiable) framework, complementarity between a set of variables means that the 
marginal returns to one variable increases in the level of any other variable, or more formally 
that the cross-partial derivatives of some payoff function are positive.  However, 
complementarity can also be present when the decision variables are discrete.  The notion of 
complementarities per se requires only that some order relation be put on the objects under 
consideration. This observation has lead to the actual formalization of the concept within the 
mathematical theory of lattices, which started with the work of Arthur Veinott and Donald 
Topkis (see for instance, Topkis (1978))1.   
The formalization of complementarities to discrete structures permits the analysis of such 
complex and discrete entities as organizational structures, institutions, and government 
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policies.  It provides a way to capture the intuitive ideas of synergies and systems effects, i.e. 
that "the whole is more than the sum of its parts."  Furthermore, it constitutes the starting 
point for an understanding of the failure of piecemeal approaches to policy.  For if the various 
elements of a given organization are complements, then adopting only some of the features of 
a better performing organization may not yield equivalent or better performance; it might 
actually worsen the current situation.   
The study of complementarity has subsequently been introduced into economics.  Paul 
Milgrom and John Roberts have considerably extended the initial work of Topkis and Veinott 
and pioneered its application to economics (see, for instance, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts 
(1990)).  For a recent reference on the theory of supermodularty and complementarity see 
Topkis (1998)2.  
An innovation system is often said to have discrete characteristics encompassing a set of 
institutions, laws, incentives, and customs.  Most importantly, factors are said to create a set 
of complementarities, through which decision variables reinforce each other.  A consequence 
of this is that piecemeal policy may not be successful, as one-dimensional policy prescriptions 
in isolation will not produce the desired outcomes. 
This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy. 
Our approach is based on governments choosing a set of parameters (policies) at the national 
level in order to maximize innovation activities. A trade-off for the government is introduced 
by assuming that policies have different effects on innovation activities at the industry level. 
For example, mandatory patenting might be a good policy in pharmaceuticals where it is easy 
to define a new product and customary for firms to patent, but it might be detrimental in other 
industries where secrecy is preferred to patenting as a means to appropriate innovation 
benefits. Another example might be tax credits. Handing out tax credits to promote R&D and 
innovation will help profitable and well-established firms but will be useless and maybe even 
counterproductive for startup firms or loss-making enterprises (Eisner, Albert and Sullivan 
(1984)). Finally, a legal system clearly defining and defending property rights provides a 
                                                 
1 Specifically, a lattice is a partially ordered set where each pair of elements { }ba,  has a least upper bound, noted 
ba Ù , and a greatest lower bound, noted ba Ú . Two objects a  and b  are then called complementary if the 
corresponding payoff function P  is supermodular, that is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )bbabaa P-ÚP£ÙP-P . 
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reliable and congenial framework for growing firms, but too much regulation and concerns 
about establishing property rights might stand in the way of innovation diffusion.  
Within this trade-off for policy decisions by government we like to ask whether policy 
decisions are complementary. If so, we would expect certain policy actions to occur together 
in order to maximize the impact on innovation activities. To address this question, we will 
assume that the impact of policy actions on the innovation activity in a given industry is 
identical across countries. In other words, staying with the above example, mandatory 
patenting is an innovation enhancing policy in pharmaceuticals in all countries. This 
assumption will lead to a similar trade-off for all countries, which implies that the 
complementarities are industry specific3.  
Even though the trade-off is the same for all countries, this does not imply that countries will 
all choose the same set of policies. Our approach will assume that there are country and 
industry-specific factors.  For instance, countries or industries might differ because of their 
institutional endowments.  According to North (1994, page 360):  
“Given that these institutions are likely to be different across countries and 
industries, such as institutions, laws, incentives, customs, etc., they will translate 
into country-specific and firm-specific heterogeneity, which in turn may lead to 
different outcomes.”   
One of the key identification assumptions of our framework is that these institutional 
endowments are separable from the rest of the system.  In other words, the complementarity 
of the objective function is independent of the endowments.  Given this separability 
assumption, we are able to develop a conceptual framework within which we can test 
complementarities in innovation policies.   
Using this framework we are able to specify a discrete test of supermodularity in innovation 
policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. Our test is based on directly estimating 
the objective function of the policy makers. In principle, testing for complementarity can be 
achieved by investigating whether the choice variables are correlated. An alternative approach 
                                                 
2 Another early contribution to economics is Vives (1990). There are also several empirical contributions to the 
study of complementarity, see for instance Ichniowski et al. (1997), Athey and Stern (1998), and Miravete and 
Pernias (2000). 
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is to test for complementarity in innovation policy by directly testing whether the objective 
function is supermodular. This is the approach taken in this paper.  
We apply our test to a new data set on European firms. For two reasons, we like to 
differentiate between two types of innovation activities: the intensity of innovation, 
conditional on doing any innovation at all, and whether a firm does any innovation or not. The 
first reason for considering the two innovation activities explicitly is that we only observe 
innovation activities, conditional on doing any innovation at all.  In other words, we have a 
censoring problem.  In order to obtain consistent estimates of complementarity in innovation, 
we estimate the probability of being an innovator, which is then used to correct for the sample 
selection.   
The second reason is that the complementarities may be rather different for the two types of 
innovation activities. Policy impacts as well as complementarity in policy may be rather 
different for the intensity of innovation, as compared to the likelihood of becoming an 
innovator.   
Our results suggest that industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with 
some industries being complementary across all obstacles. Generally, complementary in the 
intensity of innovation appears to be more pronounced than in the probability of becoming an 
innovator.  This indicates that these two innovation processes, i.e. the intensity of innovation 
vs. the probability of becoming an innovator are subject to different constraints.  This also 
implies that policies to remove obstacles to innovation may result in rather different effects, 
depending on whether they are designed to stimulate innovation by incumbents (i.e. the 
intensity of innovation, conditional on being an innovator) or to stimulate entry (i.e. increase 
the probability of becoming an innovator). 
In terms of obstacles we find that the lack of internal human capital (skilled personal) is 
complementary with all the other obstacles in almost all industries. This is true for both the 
intensity of innovators as well as new innovators. It appears that internal human capital is key, 
insofar that it is complementary to all the other factors that might hamper innovation 
activities. In terms of innovation policy this finding of human capital complementarity 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, one could allow for the trade-off to vary across industries and countries. However, this will lead to 
a number of complications in the econometric specification. In this sense, our assumption of “global” 
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suggests that measures directed at removing barriers to innovation may be more effective if 
those measures are also explicitly directed at increasing the level of internal human capital.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the framework, while Section 3 defines 
supermodularity in innovation. Section 4 specifies the test and section 5 discusses the results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Innovation Policy 
We begin by assuming that innovation in each industry is affected by K policy variables, 
which are taken by governments at the national level. We denote government actions in 
country j by a vector ),....,,( 21 Kjjjj aaaa = . Note that these actions are not industry-specific, and 
are set at the economy-wide level.   
Innovation takes place at the industry level and is determined by the K policy variables as 
well as country-specific and industry-specific exogenous factors denoted by a vector ijq , such 
that ),( ijji aI q , where i denotes the industry. The exogenous factors ijq  represent institutions, 
history, customs, norms, technologies, etc. and are assumed to be separable from the 
government’s actions.  As we will see below, this allows us to consider the issue of 
complementarity in actions independently of the exogenous factors.  
Another important assumption we are making is worth emphasizing early: the industry-level 
innovation function ),( ijji aI q  does not depend on the country (except for the institutional 
endowments ijq ).  In other words, the effect of the governments actions does not depend on 
the country, only the industry.  This implies that a particular industry’s needs in terms of 
policies (for instance easy finance, flexible labor markets) are identical across all countries. 
This assumption is crucial insofar it will imply that complementarity in a particular industry 
exists either for all countries, or for no country4.   
                                                 
complementarities at the industry level is more tractable.  
4 It is unclear as to why the trade-off would vary across countries, given that technologies and thus the constraints 
faced by firms should all work in the same direction across countries.  For this reason, it appears more 
reasonable to base national differences on the exogenous variables rather than the trade-off within an industry. 
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For conceptional purposes, one could think of a two-stage framework.  In stage two, domestic 
firms in each industry maximize innovation given a particular policy.  Stage one allows for 
the national governments to choose the innovation environment.  The problem of the 
government is then to choose a set of “national parameters” ),....,,( 21 Kjjjj aaaa =  that maximize 
innovation across all industries, i.e. å
i
ijjia
aI ),(max q .  A trade-off is present whenever an action 
has opposite effects on innovation across industries.  For example, an increase in ja1  may 
increase innovation in industry i, but decrease innovation in industry i+1.  In other words, 
governments cannot create the optimal environment for each industry, as they set parameters 
at the national level.5   
Given this environment we like to provide evidence on the existence of complementarity in 
government actions. In principle there are two levels at which complementarity could exist: 
(i) there could be complementarity at the economy-wide level (macro-complementarity), 
and/or (ii) there could be complementarity at the industry level (micro-complementarity).  
Testing macro-complementarity would imply a test of whether innovation at the economy-
wide level is complementary in government actions, i.e. whether å
i
ijji aI ),( q  is supermodular 
in a.  Analogously, testing micro-complementarity would imply a test of whether innovation 
at the industry-wide level is complementary in government actions, i.e. whether ),( ijji aI q  is 
supermodular in a.   
Lemma 2.6.1 from Topkis (1978) shows that the sum of supermodular functions defined on a 
lattice, is also supermodular.  In our context this implies that whenever the innovation 
function for all the industries are supermodular, so is the entire country-level objective 
function. Including weights on the individual industry innovation functions does not change 
this result (see Lemma 2.6.1. in Topics (1978)).  In other words, micro-level complementarity 
for all industries implies macro-level complementarity.  The reverse is not true. 
Testing for complementarity in innovation policies could, in principle, proceed by checking 
supermodularity of ),( ijji aI q , assuming that data on government actions are available. 
Unfortunately, the available data on innovation (see below) do not report government actions.  
                                                 
5  For example Levin et al. (1987) show that patents are perceived as effective means of appropriability in 
Pharmaceuticals but not in most of the other industries.   
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Instead, we have measures of the obstacles to innovation.  Assuming that the relationship 
between actions and obstacles is monotone, we can infer complementarity between actions by 
measuring complementarity between obstacles.  In particular, monotonicity between actions 
and obstacles is likely to hold within an industry, which allows us to proxy actions with 
obstacles.  Given that only obstacles are observable, and assuming that monotonicity between 
actions and obstacles holds at the industry-level, we proceed to measure complementarity in 
actions at the industry level only.  
Let the industry-level innovation function be defined as follows, 
)),(),....,(),((),( 2211 ijKjkijijiiijji aCaCaCfaI qq =     [1] 
where Cki, where k=1,…,K are a number of innovation constraints faced by firms in industry i.  
These innovation constraints are in turn determined by the actions of the government in 
country j.6  According to the above mentioned trade-off for the government an action may 
have opposite effects on obstacles across industries.  For example, an increase in ja1  may 
increase the constraint iC1  in industry i, but decrease the constraint 1,1 +iC  in industry i+1.  In 
particular, we will assume that the effect of kja  on )( kjki aC  is weakly monotone for each k, j, 
and i.  In line with the above argument, we assume that C depends only on the industry and 
the actions, not the country.  This implies that the effect of an action on a constraint is the 
same across countries in a given industry, i.e. complementarity in a particular industry exists 
either for all countries, or for no country. 
Given monotonicity at the industry level, we are able to measure complementarity in actions 
through data on obstacles.  In other words, we can simplify [1] to, 
),,....,,(),( 21 ijkiiiiji CCCfCI qq =        [2] 
and test whether [2] is supermodular in the obstacles. Given that we will measure 
complementarity in obstacles and that the effects of actions on obstacles are potentially very 
different across industries (this is indeed where the government’s trade-off comes from), we 
                                                 
6 Note that [1] assumes that each action effects exactly one constraint. 
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are not able to link our results to precise policy measures. However, we are able to provide 
evidence on whether complementarity in policy actions exist. 
3. Supermodularity of the Innovation Function 
 
Given the above framework, we can now define complementarity in innovation policy by 
checking whether the innovation function is supermodular in obstacles.  Let the innovation 
function for industry i be given by [2], where the obstacle set C ( CCi Î ) is a set of elements 
that form a lattice and the q ’s are exogenous parameter.  We define complementarity of the 
innovation function as follows (see for example Milgrom and Roberts 1990, page 516). 
Definition: Let iC¢  and iC ¢¢  be two elements in the obstacle set.  Then the industry innovation 
function ),( ijiCI q  is supermodular if and only if ),(),(),(),( ijiijiiijiiji CCICCICICI qqqq ¢¢Ù¢+¢¢Ú¢£¢¢+¢ . 
We will test this below. 
A Simple Example: 
A simple example might be useful for illustrative purposes.  Suppose there are two binary 
decision variables, which implies that the set C consists of four elements 
{ }{ }{ }{ }{ }11,1001,00=C .  For example, a country may adopt flexible labor markets and a 
market-based financial system (corresponding to 001 =iC ) or choose less flexible labor 
markets and less market-based finance (corresponding to { }114 =iC ), as well as the mixed 
cases.  Define the ordering of the elements in the set a as the component-wise order under 
the “max” operation, for example { } { } { } 432 11)10max,01(max iii CCC ===Ú .  This will produce 
the Hasse diagram below. 
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Figure 1 
 
      { }114 =iC   
 
 
 
   { }103 =iC      { }012 =iC  
 
 
      { }001 =iC  
 
 
Using the above definition of supermodularity, several other useful results can be derived.  
For example, using properties of systems of complements relating to monotone comparative 
statics, it can be shown (see Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) that the comparative statics on the 
maximizers ( )q*iC  are unambiguous, whenever ),( ijiCI q  is supermodular with respect to the 
lattice C.  In other words, the set of choice variables in C are complementary, moving up or 
down together in a systematic, coherent fashion, depending on the environmental parameter 
ijq . 
Another important result for the empirical implementation below is that it suffices to check 
pairwise complementarities in case there are more dimensions than two in the lattice (Topkis, 
1978).  In other words, a function is supermodular over all its arguments, if and only if all 
pairwise components satisfy the above definition. 
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As was mentioned above, (see Topkis (1978)) the sum of supermodular functions defined on 
a lattice is also supermodular.  This implies that micro-level complementarity for all 
industries implies macro-level complementarity.  The reverse is not true. 
Given these properties of supermodularity, we now derive the constraints that need to be 
satisfied for the industry innovation function to be supermodular.  Let the K obstacles to 
innovation be binary, i.e. they take on the value of either 1 (high) or 0 (low).  Define an 
element of the set C ( CCi Î ) as a string of K binary digits, where the individual binary 
components of each element of the set C represent the obstacles to innovation.  Thus, there 
are K2  elements in C.  In terms of our data set below we have chosen 4 obstacles, which 
implies that K=4.  The elements in C are therefore (0000), (0001), (0010),……,(1111), a total 
of 16 elements.  Define the ordering of the elements in the set C as the component-wise order 
under the “max” operation (like in the above simple example).  This implies that the set C is a 
lattice.  Finally, define the innovation function [2] over the set C.   
Using the definition of supermodularity, and the fact that we only need to check pair-wise 
elements, it can be shown that the number of nontrivial7 inequality constraints implied by the 
definition of supermodularity is equal to ( )å
-
=
-
1
1
22
K
i
K i , where K is the number of obstacles and 
i=2 (binary).  Since K=4, we have a total of 24 nontrivial inequality constraints.   
In particular, using the above definition of supermodularity we can write the 4 nontrivial 
inequality constraints for obstacle 1 and 2 to be complementary in innovation as, 
( ) ( ) ( )XXIXXIXXIXXI 1100)01(10 +£+ ,  where { }11,10,01,00=XX    [3] 
Similarly, the 4 nontrivial inequalities necessary to hold for obstacles 1 and 3 to be 
complementary are, 
( ) ( ) ( )XXIXXIXXIXXI 1100)10(01 +£+ ,  where { }11,10,01,00=XX . 
The remaining 16 constraints corresponding to complementarity between obstacles 1 and 4, 2 
and 3, 2 and 4, and 3 and 4 are analogous.  Complementarity over all actions is given, 
whenever all the 24 inequality constraints are satisfied.   
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We next turn to the empirical analysis, which will test for complementarity by checking 
whether these constraints are accepted by our data on innovation. 
 
4. Empirical Implementation 
Testing for complementarity can be achieved by investigating, whether the choice variables 
are correlated (see for example Miravete and Pernias (2000)).  For instance, within the context 
of our simple example above, if the two countries are located at { }11  and { }01 , there is little 
evidence of complementarity.  However, evidence of complementarity would be if one 
country is at { }11  and the other at { }00 .  One approach followed by Miravete and Pernias 
(2000) is to estimate the correlation in choice variables from the first-order conditions.  
Generally, this procedure requires observability of the choice variables, but not the objective.   
An alternative approach is to test for complementarity in innovation policy by directly testing 
whether the objective function is supermodular, which requires that the objective is 
observable.  This is the approach followed in this paper.   
After a brief description of the data we will then turn to our test of complementarity. 
 
4.1 The CIS data 
In 1992, the statistical agency of the European Union - Eurostat - directed a coordinated effort 
to collect firm-level data on innovation in the EU member countries. The Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS 1) data were collected using a similar questionnaire and comparable 
sampling procedures. To date, there has been relatively little econometric analysis of this data 
set, but given the information it offers, it is ideally suited for tackling the research tasks 
described here. 
The data set comprises individual firm data on some general characteristics of the firm (main 
industry of affiliation, sales, employment, export sales), various innovation measures, 
                                                 
7 The remaining constraints are equalities. 
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numerous perceptions of factors hampering or fostering innovation, and some economic 
impact measures of innovation. We use the CIS 1 survey data from four countries: Ireland, 
Denmark, Germany, and Italy.8  The data are made publicly available at a micro-aggregated 
level, i.e. continuous variables are averaged over three observations of consecutive rank 
within an industry. Non-aggregated individual responses can be used for empirical studies at 
the Eurostat site in Luxemburg. However, the micro-aggregation procedures chosen by 
Eurostat allow us in principle to apply the full set of micro-econometric techniques even with 
the aggregated data. The possibility of a micro-aggregation bias in the presence of nonlinear 
estimation techniques is an interesting topic in itself, but we shall not pursue it here. 
Of particular importance is a survey question in which firms were asked to evaluate the 
importance of potential innovation obstacles. These obstacles can be categorized into four 
groups (see Appendix 2): factors relating to risk and finance, factors relating to knowledge-
skill within the enterprise, factors measuring the knowledge-skill outside the enterprise, and 
finally regulation.  The country heterogeneity in obstacle perception and the complementarity 
between these potential impediments are the focus of this paper. 
Aggregating the obstacles in each group would be inconsistent with our assumption of 
obstacle-specific functions linking constraints to government actions.  Therefore we have 
decided to analyze four specific obstacles, the most representative a priori of each group: lack 
of appropriate sources of finance, lack of skilled personnel, lack of opportunities of 
cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, and legislation, norms, 
regulations, standards, taxation (see Appendix 2). The respondents had to answer these 
questions on a Likert scale (one to five).  
There may very well be a country specific response bias, which could for instance be due to 
differences across countries in survey methods or questionnaires.  In order to control our 
estimates for such country effects in responding to the questionnaire, we have transformed the 
responses into binary responses, according to whether or not the response to each question 
was above or below the average country response (for all obstacles and industries), which 
was 1.89 in Ireland, 2.03 in Denmark, 2.10 in Germany and 1.94 in Italy.  
                                                 
8 France had no questions on innovation obstacles, Portugal and the Netherlands had missing values for some 
innovation obstacles, Greece and Norway had too few observations, and the Belgian survey was actually the 
result of three regional surveys and therefore not considered homogeneous enough. 
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The data have been cleaned for outliers, missing values and inconsistencies. In particular we 
dropped firms with less than 20 employees, with sales growth rates higher than 250% or 
lower than –40% between 1990 and 1992, with R&D/sales ratios higher than 50%. We 
eliminate 17% of the original sample for Denmark, 30% for Ireland, 36% in Germany and 
17% in Italy. 
 
4.2  Complementarity Test – Specification 
To test the inequality constraints implied by complementarity, we need to get consistent 
estimates of the effects of obstacles on innovation.  Recall from [2] that the innovation 
function at the industry level is determined by the states of obstacles perception as well as 
other exogenous industry and country specific effects.  Recall further that we have assumed 
that the function is separable.  We therefore specify the following innovation function for a 
particular industry 
ijjijiji
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where I  is a measure of innovation.  There are a number of possible variables related to 
innovative activities in the CIS data set.  We use the percentage in sales of innovative 
products as our innovation variable.  In addition, we control for several exogenous factors that 
influence innovation, ijZ .  As exogenous shifters we use a size dummies, a dummy for 
whether the firm belongs to a group, the R&D per sales ratio, a dummy for continuous R&D, 
and a dummy for whether the firm is engaged in cooperative R&D.  In line with our above 
framework, we control for industry and country specific exogenous variables, ijq .  We do so 
by specifying country specific fixed effects, jD , and by estimating a separate regression for 
each industry.  Summary statistics of all variables used in [4] are provided in Table 1. 
Turning to the obstacles we define lijs  as a dummy variable corresponding to state l in country 
j and industry i.  For convenience, we define the dummy variables by following the 
convention of binary algebra9.  Note the in [4] there are 16 state dummies, which are allowed 
                                                 
9 In other words,  0ls  corresponds to state 0000, 1ls  to 0001, ….. , 15ls  to 1111. 
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to vary across industries, but are constant across countries.  As discussed above, this is in line 
with the idea that the complementarity structure is identical across countries for a given 
industry, and also a consequence of the separability assumption.  Using this specification of 
the innovation function and the definition of the state dummies, we can write the inequality 
constraints for supermodularity as a set of restrictions on the coefficients on the state 
variables10.  Using [3] and [4], the four constraints for obstacles 1 and 2 to be complementary 
can be compactly written as (we drop the subscript i for convenience), 
 3,2,1,0        where,  12048 =+£+ ++++ sssss gggg       (comp12) 
Similarly, the other complementarity conditions can be written as, 
 5,4,1,0        where,  10028 =+£+ ++++ sssss gggg       (comp13) 
 6,4,2,0s        where,  9018 =+£+ ++++ ssss gggg       (comp14) 
 9,8,1,0        where,  6024 =+£+ ++++ sssss gggg       (comp23) 
 10,8,2,0        where,  5014 =+£+ ++++ sssss gggg       (comp24) 
12,8,4,0        where,  3012 =+£+ ++++ sssss gggg       (comp34) 
Note that complementarity over the entire set will involve all 24 constraints to hold for a 
given industry.  However, complementarity in innovation may also be present over a subset of 
the above constraints.   
We are now ready to specify our test for supermodularity assuming that we have consistent 
estimates of the lig ’s from [4].  As we mentioned above, it suffices to test obstacles in a 
pairwise fashion. For computational reasons, which will become apparent below, we are 
unable to test all the 24 inequality constraints simultaneously. We therefore proceed by testing 
complementarity for each pair of obstacles separately.  
                                                 
10 It is worth mentioning that the above specification [4] can also be equivalently written in terms of obstacle  
dummies instead of state dummies. In this case, intuitively, the conditions for complementarity concern 
interaction effects between obstacles.  Note that this is not equivalent to the cross-partials between those two 
obstacles, since the derivative w.r.t. a discrete variable is not defined. 
     
 16
We propose to carry out two types of tests depending on what we choose as our null 
hypothesis.  The first test takes (weak) supermodulatity as its null hypothesis, while the 
alternative is no supermodularity in the innovation function. In this case, the test for 
complementarity in the innovation function between obstacles 1 and 2 is given by, 
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s00 =£-++ ++++ sH ss gggg   [weak supermodularity] 
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s01 =>-++ ++++ sH ss gggg  [no supermodularity] 
The other 6 complementarity relationships are analogous. Intuitively, complementarity is 
rejected when the upper tail of the joint distribution of the parameter constraints 
corresponding to a pair of obstacles is sufficiently small.  To compute this joint probability for 
the above test, we need to integrate a four-variate distribution function.  More precisely, at the 
boundary the null hypothesis can be expressed as an equality constraint in the form 0=gS , 
where S is a 4x k2  matrix, where S is partitioned as ]|||[ 3210 SSSS .  Under the null hypothesis 
( 0=gS ) the joint restrictions are distributed as =v )')ˆcov(,0(~ˆ SSNS gg , where )ˆcov(g is the 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimated g coefficients. The p-value of rejecting the null 
hypothesis is given by the value of the upper tail distribution of a four-variate normal 
distribution ò ò ò ò
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
g g g g
j
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1 2 3
.)(
S S S S
dvv  For instance, a value of the upper tail for this integral of 0.06 
implies that there is a probability of error of 6% by rejecting the null of supermodularity for a 
pair of obstacles. In other words, large p-values imply acceptance of weak supermodularity. 
The second test we propose is more conservative, and takes (strong) complementarity as the 
alternative. In this case, the test for complementarity in the innovation function between 
obstacles 1 and 2 is given by (again the other 6 complementarity relationships are analogous), 
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s00 =³-++ ++++ sH ss gggg  [no supermodularity] 
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s01 =<-++ ++++ sH ss gggg  [strong supermodularity] 
In this case, no complementarity is rejected when the lower tail of the joint distribution of the 
parameter constraints corresponding to a pair of obstacles is sufficiently small.  The p-value 
of rejecting the null hypothesis is given by the value of the lower tail distribution of a four-
variate normal distribution ò ò ò ò
¥- ¥- ¥- ¥-
g g g g
j
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1 2 3
.)(
S S S S
dvv  For instance, a value of the lower tail for this 
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integral of 0.06 implies that there is a probability of error of 6% by accepting the alternative 
of supermodularity for a pair of obstacles. In other words, low p-values indicate evidence in 
favor of strong supermodularity. 
It is clear that the two tests are just the complement of each other, since they integrate up to 
the same values of the constraints. However, the second test is more demanding in terms of 
finding supermodularity, since the null hypothesis is chosen as no supermodularity. We 
therefore report both tests below. To compute the test statistics we need to compute the four-
variate integrals, which is done by using the GHK simulator (see Mariano et al, 2000).11  
Before we report our test results, we need to return to the estimation of [4]. Recall that our 
supermodularity test is based on consistent estimates of the lig ’s.  
 
4.3  Econometric Issues and Estimation 
An important consideration is to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the lig ’s.  A 
significant problem might arise due to the fact that we observe innovation activity by a 
particular firm only if this firm in fact innovates.  Many firms in our sample do not innovate 
at all, i.e. we have that 0=ijI , which may give rise to serious censoring.   
Besides the econometric problem of censoring, which has to be handled properly to lead to 
consistent estimates of innovation, we may also be interested to test the hypothesis of 
complementarity in whether firms do innovate at all.  As we mentioned above, there are 
actually two separate effects of obstacles on innovation activities.  The first one is on the 
intensity of innovation, conditionally on innovating at all.  Second, obstacles might prevent a 
firm from doing any innovation at all.  In principle, a change in the obstacles to innovation 
will have an impact on both effects: the probability of innovating and the intensity of 
innovating.   
                                                 
11 We thank Donis Bolduc for sharing the Gauss programming of the GHK simulator. 
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In order to capture the second effect of obstacles on innovation and to correct for censoring, 
we specify a probit model for the probability of innovating (suppressing firm subscripts 
again): 
ijjijiji
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where ijPI  is the latent variable corresponding to the probability of innovating, ijZ  are 
exogenous variables (size and group dummies in this case), and lijs  are the states of obstacle 
perception defined above.  Innovating firms have positive values for ijPI , non-innovating 
firms have negative values.  A firm is considered as innovative if it reports a positive share in 
sales of innovative products.12  The error terms ije and ijm are assumed to be jointly normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix S , with .,,1 212222211 rsssss === 13 
Consistent estimates of the parameters in [4] and [5] are obtained by estimating a generalized 
tobit model with maximum likelihood. We maximize the likelihood of observing the binary 
data on whether a firm innovates or not, and on the intensity if it is innovative. In order to 
have ijm vary between - ¥ to + ¥ , we transform ijI , bounded between 0 and 1, to 
))1/(ln( ijij II - and add the corresponding Jacobian to the likelihood function, yielding: 
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where for notational convenience we drop the i and j subscripts, denote the regressors and 
parameters appearing in [4] as 2x and 2b respectively, and those in [5] as 1x and 1b . The index 
0 under the summation sign refers to non-innovators and the index 1 to innovators. F denotes 
the standard normal distribution and j the standard normal density. 
                                                 
12 Few firms declare to be innovative in processes and not in products. By focusing on shares in sales of 
innovative products, we actually capture process innovations as well. 
13 111 =s for reasons of identification. 
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The constraints and hypothesis test for complementarity in becoming an innovator are 
analogous to the previous sub-section except that the lg ’s are replaced by the corresponding 
ll ’s. 
5. Empirical Results 
Before we turn to the econometric evidence, we present some descriptive evidence in form of 
simple count statistics.  The idea is to infer something about complementarity by looking at 
occurrences. For instance if obstacle one occurs more often together with obstacle two, rather 
than separately, we might conclude that complementarity between the two obstacles exist. 
Table 2 shows the frequency of occurrences of our 16 states in the full sample of all 
observations in the four countries, as well as in the sub-sample of innovating firms.  The 
occurrences are classified in the order of binary arithmetic.   
Looking at Table 2, it is clear that the most frequent responses are the two extremes; zero 
everywhere and one everywhere, as well as lack of appropriate sources of finance and zero for 
the other obstacles.  It appears that there is some evidence of complementarity in this data. In 
terms of pairwise complementarity, there are a large number of possible counts to consider. 
For example, in the food industry, obstacle 3 (external knowledge) and obstacle 4 (regulation) 
are more often perceived similarly (strong if 1, weak if 0) than differently, regardless of how 
the other two obstacles are perceived: the occurrence of (0000) plus (0011) is more frequent 
than (0001) plus (0010), etc. This holds for both data sets, i.e. ALL FIRMS (top of Table 2) as 
well as INNOVATORS (bottom of Table 2). A similar result applies to obstacle 1 (finance) 
and obstacle 2 (personnel). We therefore have some descriptive evidence of pairwise 
complementarity. 
There is however, also evidence of lack of complementarity. For example, in the metal 
industry obstacles 3 and 4 are not complementary as indicated by occurrences: the frequency 
of (0100) plus (0111) is smaller than (0101) plus (0110) for INNOVATORS (bottom of Table 
2). Interestingly, the complementarity is present if one considers ALL FIRMS, which implies 
that the censoring problem discussed above may be important in determining 
complementarity.  
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In sum, it appears that the descriptive evidence regarding supermodularity is mixed.  Of 
course, looking at counts can only be considered suggestive and yields a very large number of 
possible computations.  We now turn to a more systematic approach, which further controls 
for other exogenous factors. 
Econometric Results 
Consistent estimates of the parameters in [4] and [5] for each industry are obtained by 
estimating a generalized tobit model with maximum likelihood. We use the estimates of lgˆ  
and llˆ  to calculate the tests of complementarity described above for both the probability of 
becoming an innovator (through llˆ ) as well as the intensity of innovation (through lgˆ ).14 
Table 3 presents the p-values of the first supermodularity test discussed above, i.e. where we 
specify weak supermodularity as the null hypothesis. Recall that the p-values indicate the 
probability of error by rejecting the null of weak supermodularity for a pair of obstacles. 
Table 3 presents p-values for each pair of obstacles for every industry and for both the 
probability to innovate and for the intensity of innovation.  For instance, the hypothesis that 
lack of finance (obstacle 1) and lack of internal human capital (obstacle 2) are complementary 
in affecting the probability of innovating in the food industry cannot be rejected at any 
reasonable level of significance (p-value of .956). In fact, this finding holds for  each pair of 
obstacles in all industries. In addition, we cannot reject weak supermodularity neither for the 
intensity of innovation nor for the probability of becoming an innovator. We therefore 
conclude that our test of weak supermodularity unanimously accepts the hypothesis of 
supermodularity in the innovation process. 
As we indicated above, the second test is more demanding in terms of finding support for the 
supermodularity hypothesis. Table 4 presents the p-values of the strong supermodularity test, 
i.e. where we specify strong supermodularity as the alternative hypothesis. Recall that the p-
values indicate the probability of error by rejecting the null of no supermodularity. For 
instance, the hypothesis that obstacle 1 (finance) and obstacle 2 (internal human capital) are 
                                                 
14 We have tested the joint significance of the coefficients relating to the obstacles to innovation. A Wald test 
revealed that for most industries the obstacles are jointly significant at a 10% level. The only exception for [4] is 
the food industry, which is only significant at the 16% level. The results for [5] are somewhat less significant, 
even though most are still significant. The exceptions here are food (20% significance level), textile (30%) non-
metallic (88%) and vehicle (33%). 
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not complementary in terms of the probability of innovating in the food industry can be 
rejected at a 5% significance level (p-value of .044)15. 
The p-values in Table 4 indicate that the hypothesis of no supermodularity in innovation 
policy cannot be rejected for all obstacles and all industries. However, there are a large 
number of pairwise complementarities that are statistically significant.  This is true for the 
probability of being an innovator as well as for the intensity of innovation.  It is also clear, 
that not all the obstacles are complementary in all industries.  In other words, not surprisingly 
we do not have full complementarities across all industries.  However, several industries 
display a high degree of supermodularity in the innovation process.  For instance, the food 
industry, the wood industry, the machinery and equipment industry, and the vehicle industry 
all exhibit full complementarities in the intensity of innovation at a 10% level.  
By contrast, the probability of innovating is much less complementary.  In fact, there is no 
industry in which full complementarity exists at the 10% level. Nevertheless, there is no 
single obstacle that is not complementary to at least one other obstacle. The only exception is 
the chemical industry, where obstacle 3 is not complementary to any other obstacle.  
We therefore find that all industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with 
the complementary being more pronounced in the intensity of innovation than in the 
probability of becoming an innovator.  This indicates that these two innovation processes, i.e. 
the intensity of innovation vs. the probability of becoming an innovator are subject to 
different constraints.   
Table 3 also shows that all obstacles are complementarity in several industries.  In other 
words, the four obstacles (finance, internal human capital, external knowledge, and 
regulation) are interrelated in a significant subset of the industries, which implies a trade off at 
the country level in terms of policy.  The highest number of significant complementary 
relationships for innovation is estimated between obstacles 2 and 3 (internal human capital 
and external knowledge) and obstacles 2 and 4 (internal human capital and regulations), 
which are both significant at the 10% level in 10 out of the 11 industries.  The former reflects 
the well-known absorption hypothesis is, according to which internal and external knowledge 
                                                 
15 Note that as expected the values in Tables 3 and 4 are just the complements of each other. For clarity, we 
present both tables. 
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reinforce each other. The latter indicates that lack of human capital is more constraining in 
regulated firms. Considering the probability of becoming an innovator, we find the highest 
number of complementary relationships between finance and internal human capital with 9 
out of 11 industries displaying significant complementarity at the 10% level. The lack of 
external capital is exacerbated by a lack of skilled personnel. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper develops a framework for testing whether complementarities in innovation policy 
exist. We specify and estimate an innovation function that allows us to test for 
supermodularity in innovation policy. We also differentiate between two separate effects: the 
first one is on the intensity of innovation, conditional that a firm does any innovation at all, 
and secondly, whether a firm does any innovation or not.  
We find that industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with some 
industries being complementary across all obstacles. Generally, complementary in the 
intensity of innovation appears to be more pronounced than in the probability of becoming an 
innovator.  This indicates that these two innovation processes, i.e. the intensity of innovation 
vs. the probability of becoming an innovator are subject to different constraints.  This also 
implies that policies to remove obstacles to innovation may result in rather different effects, 
depending on whether they are designed to stimulate innovation by incumbents (i.e. the 
intensity of innovation, conditional on being an innovator) or to stimulate entry (i.e. increase 
the probability of becoming an innovator). 
In terms of obstacles we find that the lack of internal human capital (skilled personal) is 
complementary with all the other obstacles in almost all industries. This is true for both the 
intensity of innovators as well as new innovators. It appears that internal human capital is key, 
insofar that it is complementary to all the other factors that might hempen innovation 
activities.  
In terms of innovation policy this finding of human capital complementarity suggests that 
measures directed at removing barriers to innovation may be more effective if those measures 
are also explicitly directed at increasing the level of internal human capital.  
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Table 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
CIS I, micro-aggregated data, 1992 (sample mean)  
 
Variable FOOD TEXT. WOOD CHEM. PLAST. N.-MET METAL M&E ELEC. VEHIC. NEC 
Percentage of innovators 0.258  
0.153 
 
0.228 
 
0.533 
 
0.446 
 
0.249 
 
0.298 
 
0.532 
 
0.531 
 
0.442 
 
0.257 
 
% in sales of innovative  
products for innovators 
0.349 
 
0.442 
 
0.378 
 
0.341 
 
0.372 
 
0.367 
 
0.373 
 
0.485 
 
0.467 
 
0.476 
 
0.462 
 
Dummy for 20-49 
employees 
0.561 
 
0.656 
 
0.628 
 
0.376 
 
0.566 
 
0.593 
 
0.625 
 
0.498 
 
0.487 
 
0.461 
 
0.699 
 
Dummy for 50-99 
employees 
0.171 
 
0.202 
 
0.198 0.196 
 
0.227 
 
0.202 
 
0.189 
 
0.224 
 
0.210 
 
0.190 
 
0.178 
 
Dummy for 100-249 
employees 
0.155 
 
0.101 
 
0.117 
 
0.209 
 
0.133 
 
0.120 
 
0.121 
 
0.151 
 
0.154 
 
0.161 
 
0.087 
 
Dummy for 250-499 
employees 
0.063 
 
0.028 
 
0.027 
 
0.098 
 
0.044 
 
0.047 
 
0.037 
 
0.059 
 
0.071 
 
0.079 
 
0.023 
 
Dummy for 500-999 
employees 
0.030 
 
0.009 
 
0.017 
 
0.058 
 
0.020 
 
0.020 
 
0.017 
 
0.032 
 
0.040 
 
0.042 
 
0.006 
 
Dummy for >999 
employees 
0.020 
 
0.004 
 
0.013 
 
0.064 
 
0.010 
 
0.017 
 
0.012 
 
0.037 
 
0.039 
 
0.067 
 
0.006 
 
Dummy for being  
part of a group 
0.248 
 
0.101 
 
0.201 
 
0.515 
 
0.270 
 
0.233 
 
0.203 
 
0.270 
 
0.323 
 
0.277 
 
0.108 
 
Export/sales ratio 0.129  
0.206 
 
0.093 
 
0.215 
 
0.228 
 
0.163 
 
0.151 
 
0.342 
 
0.229 
 
0.244 
 
0.244 
 
Number of employees 151  
72 
 
94 
 
484 
 
158 
 
147 
 
131 
 
231 
 
291 
 
1203 
 
73 
 
R&D/sales ratio for 
innovators 
0.011 
 
0.014 
 
0.011 
 
0.032 
 
0.017 
 
0.020 
 
0.019 
 
0.028 
 
0.047 
 
0.030 
 
0.016 
 
% of innovators doing R&D 
continuously 
0.447 
 
0.427 
 
0.289 
 
0.768 
 
0.527 
 
0.535 
 
0.432 
 
0.656 
 
0.697 
 
0.609 
 
0.403 
 
% of innovators doing  
cooperative R&D 
0.168 
 
0.052 
 
0.081 
 
0.314 
 
0.119 
 
0.132 
 
0.114 
 
0.167 
 
0.245 
 
0.262 
 
0.052 
 
Number of observations 1541 4540 1899 1059 963 1433 3372 2930 1964 788 1578 
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Table 2 
OBSTACLE OCCURRENCES 
 
Obstacle 
Occurrences 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111 
  ALL FIRMS 
Industries                 
FOOD 0.244 0.022 0.015 0.006 0.023 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.130 0.053 0.019 0.036 0.045 0.059 0.045 0.262 
TEXTILE 0.297 0.029 0.016 0.010 0.022 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.183 0.075 0.035 0.050 0.057 0.051 0.043 0.106 
WOOD 0.258 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.021 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.139 0.043 0.019 0.033 0.050 0.068 0.048 0.256 
CHEM 0.265 0.051 0.010 0.009 0.023 0.026 0.007 0.016 0.150 0.091 0.026 0.065 0.054 0.065 0.032 0.111 
PLASTIC 0.280 0.029 0.020 0.007 0.026 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.164 0.067 0.037 0.059 0.062 0.056 0.049 0.104 
NON-MET 0.228 0.025 0.009 0.008 0.022 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.113 0.044 0.017 0.038 0.057 0.078 0.045 0.281 
METAL 0.281 0.025 0.011 0.008 0.024 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.171 0.079 0.040 0.049 0.059 0.058 0.049 0.109 
M&E 0.225 0.033 0.017 0.011 0.033 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.153 0.078 0.038 0.048 0.072 0.070 0.053 0.130 
ELEC 0.227 0.026 0.017 0.010 0.039 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.155 0.074 0.047 0.056 0.073 0.063 0.060 0.101 
VEHIC 0.214 0.023 0.015 0.008 0.024 0.019 0.006 0.010 0.178 0.100 0.036 0.055 0.083 0.065 0.053 0.112 
NEC 0.291 0.032 0.013 0.008 0.026 0.014 0.008 0.019 0.169 0.066 0.034 0.043 0.055 0.051 0.063 0.110 
  INNOVATORS 
FOOD 0.199 0.030 0.015 0.013 0.035 0.035 0.005 0.020 0.118 0.063 0.023 0.038 0.058 0.073 0.045 0.231 
TEXTILE 0.241 0.029 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.192 0.084 0.040 0.053 0.075 0.056 0.055 0.089 
WOOD 0.185 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.127 0.049 0.021 0.039 0.065 0.097 0.046 0.270 
CHEM 0.204 0.059 0.009 0.012 0.027 0.032 0.007 0.016 0.140 0.090 0.028 0.075 0.060 0.089 0.037 0.115 
PLASTIC 0.226 0.026 0.012 0.007 0.040 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.166 0.068 0.040 0.070 0.082 0.065 0.051 0.084 
NON-MET 0.160 0.042 0.003 0.017 0.031 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.098 0.045 0.020 0.028 0.078 0.098 0.053 0.283 
METAL 0.209 0.029 0.012 0.009 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.012 0.185 0.089 0.049 0.051 0.061 0.074 0.056 0.096 
M&E 0.169 0.039 0.022 0.013 0.040 0.021 0.013 0.015 0.155 0.081 0.041 0.052 0.077 0.075 0.049 0.140 
ELEC 0.173 0.026 0.016 0.013 0.044 0.026 0.017 0.016 0.165 0.076 0.052 0.065 0.090 0.070 0.052 0.099 
VEHIC 0.135 0.029 0.017 0.012 0.035 0.020 0.009 0.006 0.195 0.095 0.049 0.063 0.095 0.081 0.049 0.112 
NEC 0.254 0.040 0.015 0.012 0.037 0.032 0.012 0.020 0.168 0.057 0.054 0.027 0.077 0.054 0.054 0.086 
Obstacle Definition: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of opportunities for cooperation 
with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations, standards, taxation. 
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Table 3 
TEST OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INNOVATION POLICY 
p-values of weak supermodularity tests  
(generalized tobit) 
 
 Probability to innovate  Amount of innovation 
Pairs of 
obstacles 
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4  1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 
              
Industries              
FOOD 0.956 0.984 0.815 0.612 0.852 0.966  0.949 0.986 0.912 0.993 0.983 0.998 
TEXTILE 0.950 0.981 0.953 0.942 0.787 0.912  0.826 0.978 0.939 0.998 0.975 0.998 
WOOD 0.961 0.842 0.990 0.849 0.932 0.975  0.968 0.990 0.930 0.908 0.993 0.999 
CHEM 0.996 0.899 0.989 0.616 0.923 0.845  0.929 0.879 0.992 0.826 0.951 0.973 
PLASTIC 0.759 0.937 0.832 0.911 0.844 0.923  0.732 0.996 0.681 0.998 0.974 0.947 
NON-MET 0.992 0.891 0.892 0.961 0.927 0.951  0.893 0.994 0.887 0.998 0.925 0.991 
METAL 0.767 0.945 0.847 0.943 0.966 0.690  0.908 0.897 0.971 0.946 0.951 0.477 
M&E 0.971 0.996 0.965 0.498 0.979 0.961  0.977 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.999 
ELEC 0.913 0.986 0.876 0.471 0.906 0.999  0.996 0.885 0.944 0.942 0.994 0.999 
VEHIC 0.990 0.943 0.977 0.562 0.956 0.935  0.996 0.900 0.981 0.995 0.939 0.995 
NEC 0.932 0.930 0.917 0.819 0.995 0.818  0.996 0.972 0.949 0.994 0.792 0.866 
Obstacle Definition: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of 
opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations, 
standards, taxation. 
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Table 4 
TEST OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INNOVATION POLICY 
p-values of strong supermodularity tests  
(generalized tobit) 
 
 Probability to innovate  Amount of innovation 
Pairs of 
obstacles 
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4  1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 
              
Industries              
FOOD 0.044 0.016 0.185 0.388 0.148 0.034  0.051 0.014 0.088 0.007 0.017 0.002 
TEXTILE 0.050 0.019 0.047 0.048 0.213 0.088  0.174 0.022 0.061 0.002 0.025 0.002 
WOOD 0.039 0.048 0.010 0.151 0.068 0.025  0.032 0.010 0.070 0.092 0.007 0.001 
CHEM 0.004 0.101 0.011 0.384 0.077 0.155  0.071 0.121 0.008 0.174 0.049 0.027 
PLASTIC 0.241 0.063 0.168 0.089 0.156 0.077  0.268 0.004 0.319 0.002 0.026 0.053 
NON-MET 0.008 0.109 0.108 0.039 0.073 0.049  0.107 0.006 0.113 0.002 0.075 0.009 
METAL 0.233 0.055 0.153 0.057 0.034 0.310  0.092 0.103 0.029 0.054 0.049 0.523 
M&E 0.029 0.004 0.035 0.502 0.021 0.039  0.023 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 
ELEC 0.087 0.014 0.124 0.529 0.094 0.001  0.004 0.115 0.056 0.058 0.006 0.001 
VEHIC 0.010 0.057 0.023 0.438 0.044 0.065  0.004 0.100 0.019 0.005 0.061 0.005 
NEC 0.068 0.070 0.083 0.181 0.005 0.182  0.004 0.028 0.051 0.006 0.208 0.134 
Obstacle Definition: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of 
opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations, 
standards, taxation. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Industry Definitions 
 
Industry NACE code Description of Industry 
 
FOOD  15-16  food, beverages and tobacco 
TEXTILE 17-19  textiles, wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur,  
tannings, and dressing of leather, luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear 
WOOD 20-22  wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture,  
straw and plaiting materials, pulp, paper, and paper products, 
publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media 
CHEM  23-24  refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, chemicals and 
chemical products 
PLASTIC 25  rubber and plastic products 
NON-MET 26  other non-metallic mineral products 
METAL 27-28  basic metals, fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
M&E  29  machinery and equipment 
ELEC  30-33  office machinery and computers, electrical machinery and  
apparatus, radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus, medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks. 
VEHIC 34-35  motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, and other transport 
equipment 
NEC   36  furniture 
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Appendix 2 
 
Obstacles to innovation* 
 
 
Category 1: Risk and finance 
Excessive perceived risk 
Lack of appropriate sources of finance 
Innovation costs too high 
Pay-off period of innovation too long 
 
Category 2: Knowledge-skill within enterprise 
Enterprises’s innovation potential too small 
Lack of skilled personnel 
Lack of information on technologies 
Lack of information on markets 
Innovation costs hard to control 
Resistance of change in the enterprise 
 
Category 3: Knowledge-skill outside the enterprise 
Deficiencies in the availability of external technical services 
Lack of opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions 
Lack of technological opportunities 
No need to innovate due to earlier innovations 
 
Category 4: Regulations 
Innovation too easy to copy 
Legislation, norms, regulations, standards, taxation 
Lack of customer responsiveness to new products and processes 
Uncertainty in timing of innovation 
 
                                                 
* The representative obstacles used in the analysis of this paper are in bold. 
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